What happens when scientists deliberately make a dangerous pathogen even more dangerous? It sounds like the premise of a thriller, and in many ways it is. But gain-of-function research is also a real and deeply controversial area of modern biology, one that sits at the sharp edge of the tension between scientific knowledge and public safety.
Gain-of-function research involves modifying a pathogen, such as a virus or bacterium, in ways that increase its transmissibility, virulence, or host range. The rationale is that by understanding how a pathogen could become more dangerous, scientists can better prepare for natural outbreaks and develop vaccines and treatments in advance.
The most prominent and contentious example involves the H5N1 avian influenza virus. In 2011 and 2012, two independent research groups demonstrated that they could modify H5N1 to make it transmissible between ferrets through airborne contact, a result with clear implications for human transmission. The publication of these findings triggered an international firestorm. Scientists, security experts, and policymakers clashed over whether the knowledge gained justified the risks of the research itself and of making the results public.
Films from the Future (Chapter 11) uses the movie Inferno to dive into the world of gain-of-function research and engineered pathogens. In the film, based on Dan Brown's novel, a brilliant but misguided scientist creates a genetically modified virus designed to reduce the global population. The science in the movie is simplified for dramatic effect, but it touches on real fears about what could happen if someone with the right knowledge decided to weaponize biology.
The book uses this premise to examine the broader landscape of dual-use research in biology. The H5N1 experiments are discussed in detail, along with the agonizing debate that followed about whether the research should have been done at all, and whether the results should have been published. The core dilemma is stark: understanding how dangerous pathogens work is essential for public health, but the very act of creating that understanding generates knowledge and materials that could be catastrophically misused.
Gain-of-function research remains one of the most divisive topics in the life sciences. Following the H5N1 controversy, the United States imposed a moratorium on federal funding for certain gain-of-function studies, which was later lifted with new oversight requirements. The debate intensified further during and after the COVID-19 pandemic, as questions about the origins of SARS-CoV-2 renewed public attention on virology research practices and laboratory safety.
The tools for conducting this kind of research are becoming more accessible. As gene-editing and DNA-synthesis technologies grow cheaper and more widely available, the barrier to modifying pathogens is lowering, which adds urgency to the governance challenges. International agreements on biosafety and biosecurity exist, but enforcement is inconsistent, and the pace of technological change is outrunning the pace of regulation.
Gain-of-function research encapsulates a dilemma that runs throughout Films from the Future: how do we manage research that has the potential to both save and endanger millions of lives? There are no easy answers. Prohibiting the research entirely could leave us unprepared for natural pandemics. But pursuing it without adequate safeguards could lead to accidental releases or deliberate misuse.
What the book emphasizes is the need for transparency, robust oversight, and inclusive decision-making. These are not questions that can be left to virologists alone. They involve public health, national security, international relations, and fundamental questions about how much risk a society is willing to accept in the pursuit of knowledge. The scientists involved bear a particular responsibility, but so do the institutions, governments, and publics that support or permit their work.